PURPLE THOUGHT
Air Marshal A V Vaidya, VM

In future, almost all operations, no matter where they take place, are invariably going to be a bi or multi service proposal. In today’s scenario, one can hardly visualize a situation where a single Service will have to undertake any kind of operation all by itself. If that be the case, then developing synergy between the various participants involved in such perations attains utmost importance to achieve maximum force effect.


The first thing that therefore needs to be done to attain the desired synergy is to clearly define the Command and Control (C2) structure and procedures that will apply to the various participating forces. These forces as they arrive at the scene, would be under the C2 of the individual Service Commanders (Cdrs). Achievement of desired synergy would be impossible if each involved individual Service Force Commander acts on his own through his respective Service/ Command HQ with whatever little dialogue possible between the various forces at the field level. Similarly dialogue at the Service HQs level is also not likely to bring the desired synergy – thanks to the inter-service rivalry and the turf wars that are prevalent between Services in almost all countries. This brings us to the first basic imperative that some Organisation is required at the field level to create this synergy and the logical question that then arises is, “What should this Organisation be”?

Quite obviously, the scenario points towards creation of one Commander and Placing the various assets under him to amalgamate and use them operationally in such a manner as to create the required synergy. He could be called the Joint Operations Force Commander (JOFC) or the Task Force Commander (TFC) or even a Theatre Commander depending upon the scale of operations being conducted, but the creation of some such Commander with all the assets placed under him cannot be negated. This Cdr could preferably be from the Service that has maximum role to play in tackling the situation and would have to be responsible for the effective operational utilisation of all the forces placed under him. The other individual Service Cdrs can act as advisors to him to ensure that specialist assets of each Service are utilized most judiciously and effectively. These officers with their respective staff can thus form some sort of a Joint Forces HQ (JFHQ) headed by Presently, between Army and Air Force, we do have some joint organizations in the form of JAAOC (Joint Army Air Ops Centre) at command level, JOC (Joint Ops Centre) at Corps level and ACT (Air Combat Team) in the TBA. Between the Navy and the Air Force we have HQ Maritime Air Ops (MAO), Maritime Element of Air Force (MEAF) and Maritime Ops Centres (MOC) but most will agree that these organizations have not been able to do real justice to jointness in planning and execution of joint ops.

Instead of having an ad-hoc arrangement of creating a JFHQ with whatever forces that arrive at the scene of contingency, one can think of a permanent JFHQ as a part of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). IDS could be given some staff by the three Services to form the JFHQ whose job would be to work out the various procedures and guidelines to the JOFC and have them sanctified. Obviously this needs to be accomplished in peace time so that the JOFC is not left high and dry without any directions available on how to operate when the contingency arises. This JFHQ staff could as well assist the Service HQ or their Command HQ in doing joint planning for some foreseeable contingencies. The JFHQ staff could also be tasked to exercise the forces periodically for the various contingencies. When the contingency actually arises and time is at a premium (which invariably almost always will be), part of this staff can immediately rush to the scene and help in organising the arrival of the forces from different Services, apprise the appointed JOFC of the laid down procedures and guidelines and part can go to the INCP (Interim National Command Post) of IDS, which is functioning on behalf of Chairman COSC (Chiefs of Staff Committee), to assist in ensuring that the laid down procedures are being implemented.

The next important question that needs attention is the chain of command of the JOFC. Under whose Command and Control does the JOFC come? Whom does he talk to when he needs help or advice? And to whom do the local Commanders of the individual Services listen to? Should they listen to the JOFC or should they listen to their Service/ Command HQ?

Past experience in Sri Lanka, Male and Kargil has clearly highlighted the fact that the chain of command of individual force commanders through their respective Command HQ is not the optimum way of operating. The chain is rather too long and the decision making accordingly that much difficult and delayed. Many operational and even non-operational issues, like for instance violation of IB or LoC, increase in the quantum of forces, media release etc, come up during the execution of the operations for which quick decisions are required from various agencies like Service HQ, MoD, MEA, MHA etc. It is almost impossible for the JOFC or the Individual Commanders to get timely decisions if they are to operate through the long chain of Command HQ to Service HQ to COSC to MoD/ MEA /MHA and back again on the same route. Obviously this chain needs to be shortened and the only logical solution appears to be removal of the Service the JOFC direct linkage to COSC through IDS. IDS can then be in contact in parallel with the Service HQs for any kind of immediate decisions as also with the bureaucracy.

Having met the initial Force requirement of supplying the demanded resources, the respective Command/Service HQ should then detach from exercising any kind of command and control over them except for providing adm and logistics support. It should thereafter be left to the JOFC to do the needful. For any further requirements, he should contact the IDS (which is representing COSC) through INCP which would be active within 24 hrs with appropriate staff and which in turn will contact the concerned Service HQ and MoD or MHA if required. This system would reduce the chain of communication and yield faster results without overstepping the authority of Service HQs.

Similarly, nomination of a JOFC or a TFC would not undermine the operational authority or powers of the individual Services. IDS, which is being proposed as the central organisation, would actually have no operational role or control over the deployed forces. IDS would merely be a catalyst or a facilitator to speed up the process of decision making in consultation with many other organisations, particularly the Service Chiefs and bureaucrats.

In other foreign countries like France which have opted for appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the operational C2 of the designated forces is actually handed over to this integrated staff which conducts the operations from their own central ops room. The three Chiefs have no operational responsibility at all. Their job is mainly enrolment of manpower, ensuring their proper training, procurement of eqpt and provisioning of operationally trained forces to the CDS whenever asked for. In UK they have a Permanent Joint HQ (PJHQ). The role of PJHQ is to work proactively to anticipate crisis and to monitor developments in areas of interest to the country. Because PJHQ has been created on a permanent basis rather than being established for a particular operation, it will be involved from the very start of planning for a possible operation. Having planned the operations and rendered advice to Ministers, PJHQ will then conduct such operations.

We in India do not foresee such an arrangement as yet and it is debatable whether such an arrangement would be suitable to us in our scenarios. But even if we decide not to put any operational forces under the IDS, it is important for better synergy that we Communicate with them through IDS.

To summarise, the requirement to appoint a JOFC at the scene where operations are taking place in order to create the necessary synergy has become unavoidable. For faster decision making, this JOFC should deal through INCP of IDS. To give necessary and timely directions to this JOFC we obviously need a Joint HQ. Creation of a JFHQ therefore, also seems very logical. IDS, which has a compact joint structure, seems an ideal organisation wherein a JFHQ can be created. Such a JFHQ will be able to ensure proper standardisation, give more focus on various contingencies and constantly update and modify the plans based on the changing security environment.

About The Author:-

Air Marshal AV Vaidya was born on 21 Feb 1948. An alumnus of the National Defence Academy and the National Defence College, he was commissioned into the fighter stream of the Indian Air Force in Dec 1968. He has over 3000 hours of accident free fighter flying on various aircraft like the Gnat, Hunter, MIG-21 and Mirage-2000. The officer has commanded a Mirage Squadron, a premier air base and has also been the Director of Air Staff Requirements at Air HQs. He was the Air Defence Commander and subsequently the Senior Air Staff Officer of an Operational Command. He is presently the Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy, Planning and Force Development) at HQ IDS. Air Marshal

AV Vaidya is a recipient of the Vayu Sena Medal.