ENHANCING JOINTNESS: ROLE OF SERVICE HQS AND HQ IDS
Brig Harsha Kakar

The CDS is no longer a debate, but is a requirement whose time has come. He will not be a single point military advisor but the single point strategic advisor
Praveen Sawhney

Introduction
The last decade has seen a major shift in the international security environment. 9/11 and the subsequent involvement of the US and NATO in Afghanistan and Iraq followed by the problems of occupation and stabilization have changed the international scenario.
The creation, growing influence and muscle flexing by the SCO, increased military cooperation between India and other like minded nations are changing the concept of threats and future involvement of the Armed Forces of the nation.

At the same time the growing Indian economy, ever increasing energy needs leading to investments in far flung energy fields, a growing nuclear power status, enhanced military capabilities and a desire by the nation to play a greater role in international affairs are projecting India into global limelight. Nearer home, India is surrounded by economically and politically unstable nations including nuclear powers, which further compound the threat scenario. The major international trouble spots are within range of affecting our growth and peaceful development. Dominique Moisi, in his article, “The Clash of Emotions” states that, “India for the first time in its modern history has stepped onto the world stage as both an independent and an important power.”

Security and development go hand in hand. Without security there is no development and without development there are no resources for security. Therefore for us to become a major power and meet the aspirations of the people it is essential that our economy continue to grow. A weak nation can and will be suppressed by stronger and more dominating powers and neighbours. Therefore for a nation to continue to prosper a sound military might is essential. In a press conference, on 07 Feb 07, after inaugurating the Aero India 07 Exposition, the Defence Minister, Mr AK Anthony stated, “We can prevent war by strong deterrence. Therefore, we have to modernise our Armed Forces.” Modernization, in this case involves creating capabilities needed for the future.

If we look at our history, we would very clearly see a very low level of jointness in all our operations. In fact it was the Kargil crises followed by the GOM report that changed the way things were being done in dealing with national security issues in India. The creation of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and more recently the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) brought to fore a subject whose time had long since come but was being sidelined due to a variety of reasons. It was the subject of Jointness within the three Services. Mr Bharat Karnad speaking on Jointness stated, “Speaking systemically, disparate elements in a total system, incapable of working in an ‘integrated’ manner and able, at most, to ‘coordinate’ their activities and that too in short spurts, end up settling on ‘jointness’ as compromise.”

Scope

This paper aims to analyze the impact of jointness in the future and the role of Service HQs and IDS in developing and promoting the concept.

Revolution in Military Affairs
In the new security paradigm, which demands a more flexible and adaptable approach, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has gained much attention in the past 8-10 years. RMA is “great change[s] in warfare” that occur when “new technologies and tactics combine to reshape the face of battle.”v It has started to have a profound force structure impact. RMA is also defined as, “a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by advances in military technology which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and organizational concepts, fundamentally alter the
character and conduct of military operations.”

In every way jointness and RMA go together. To achieve RMA all combat has to begin with an information superiority phase. This implies that the first phase of any war must be given over to gaining information dominance, which is done by destroying the enemy’s information infrastructure. This is a tri service operation and would involve a high level of integration. In addition for the Armed Forces to employ the benefits of RMA, introducing joint doctrines and concepts is a pre requisite.

RMA is meant to be a long term exercise in defence budgeting, resource allocation and force structuring, and is predicated to a large extent on a smaller, more capital intensive force. Although RMA is more than reliance on enhanced technology, the fact remains that RMA is an expensive proposition, driven primarily by the cost of emerging technology, including R&D costs.

Need For Jointness

Wars of the future would be restricted in scope and content. Though in the international arena, the possibility of conventional (state on state) wars has receded, however in our context such a possibility, though limited continues to exist. Therefore this needs to be factored into all futuristic planning. This adds to the problem when catering for the force of tomorrow. The long term assessment by all think tanks and futuristic planning organizations indicate a different level of threat in the next two decades. The involvement of the Armed Forces in future operations as a whole would be more as joint forces rather than as independent services. This therefore implies that our planning for the next two decades should aim at developing joint rather than single service capabilities. If we have to achieve those capabilities in the future we have to commence planning for them now as development of capabilities take time.

The raising of the two joint commands in India has not been without reason. It has been clearly understood by the national security environment that the future belongs to joint operations. Though the commands are fully operational, yet their raising and future capabilities earmarked for them are under debate. However, the fact that these would need joint capabilities is well understood. What has not been done yet is planning their future capabilities. This has mainly been due to the fact that this is to be created and provided by individual services and their reactions on this have been slow.

Resources are limited. Demands for the scarce resources are mounting. There is always a major debate on resources, which need to be allocated for maintaining the force of today, which is essential to cater for existing threats, and the resources needed for the force of tomorrow. In addition, in a democracy there are a number of conflicting social needs which also need to be catered for. The resources available would always be short of what is ideal and desired. Hence careful evaluation of futuristic requirements and capabilities need to be done. This is only possible if a joint approach to planning is adopted and a common set of desired capabilities identified.

Developing Future Capabilities

The dilemma facing strategic force planners is to be able to realistically assess the futuristic requirement of employment of the Armed Forces and then transform the existing large, conventional war oriented force into a responsive, deployable, modern, suitably equipped effective force capable of facing emerging future security threats. In addition is the fact of catering for the existing strategic voids.

The force of the future should be organized and structured for employment well away from the borders of South Asia. Hence the force would have to be a joint force formed on a concept of modules enabling rapid creation of the requisite structure based on need and desired employment. Therefore it is paramount that joint operational capability and inter operability be built into the system. This is only possible if Capability Based Planning is adopted.

Capability Based Planning
Capability Based Planning (CBP) as an approach aims at addressing a requirement to produce a flexible and responsive defence force. In theory, CBP depends on mission analysis and centres on a building block, modular concept that allows capabilities to be assembled quickly in response to a given threat. The required skill is in rapid assembly of forces vice the traditional optimization of an established force structure that supports the current defence planning process.

This modular concept quickly merges into a debate with respect to force structure,
and raises the difficult question of how many resources should be allocated to personnel and consumables (the force of today) or to capital (the force of tomorrow).As the Armed Forces simultaneously wrestle with sustaining, growing and transforming the force (while supporting ongoing operations), the issues pertaining to trade off remain extant.

CBP follows the stages of developing the Armed Forces of the future. In simple
terms it hinges on the premise of identifying what we need for the future in terms of capabilities and the areas and situations (possible threats) in which we would operate. Once we have identified our methodology and conditions of employment we would need to identify the capabilities for such engagements. The next stage would be assessing the gaps between the existing and desired capabilities. This would result in a clear definition of the changes we need to make in our future planning. It would then assist in defining our priorities and allocating resources for the future. This would be based on a time line to ensure that we achieve the planned capabilities in a desired time frame.

Capability based planning requires a dedicated organization with requisite teeth and authority to initially identify and then monitor the planning process thereby ensuring that the capabilities are developed in the desired timeframe. Ideally, HQ IDS with a CDS at the head is the primary organization, which can implement CBP.This organization with a CDS would possess the requisite teeth and power to implement the process. It would also need to amalgamate the concerned planning and financial branches of the three services.This would involve immense coordination and support from the three services. This aspect is being considered in a CDS and a non CDS environment.

Pakistan is extremely limited in time and space. This requires excellent synergy for decisive operational results. Two, India has embarked upon the strategic option for its Armed Forces. Once the services go beyond the tactical
interactions with friendly defence services, the need for inter service jointness would be paramount..…..The third reason is that the CDS as the single point advisor, like the NSA, should be present at most Cabinet Committee on
National Security meetings.”

The CDS when appointed would be a single point advisor to the Govt on all
security issues. He would need to be appointed by an act of parliament with requisite authority vested in him. He would be the strategic leader with a major responsibility of force development and capability creation. Ideally in such an environment the force employers would be the tri service Theatre Commanders whose appointments would follow as a logical consequence of creation of the CDS.

In such an environment the service HQs would function under the overall control of the CDS. In this case cooperation and integration would be a matter of routine and policy. Force development and employment would be more stream lined and jointness between services better. This would be natural as Theatre Commanders would have all resources in a theatre under them and their employment coordinated and integrated. Hence the Armed Forces would embrace jointness more easily.

Role of Service and IDS HQs in a non CDS Environment

It is in the present construct that the service and IDS HQs have a greater role to play. The existing environment has the COSC as the main coordinating body between the services, and also has HQ IDS functioning under it. Mr. V. Shankar, (Defence Secretary in 1967-68), commenting upon the existing COSC system, “In the absence of one single head at the top of Defence Force’s organizations today, the ultimate burden of coordination, superior direction and working out of policies, of evolving weapon concepts suitable to the Defence Policy and Strategy and of settling inter-service rivalries or competing demands largely falls on the Defence Secretary and the Defence Minister...he (Defence Minister) does not have independent advice at the professional level. To expect that annually changing Chairman of the COSC would be able to fill the gap is, to my mind to ask for the impossible”. There are shortfalls in the present system, which need to be overcome by the integrated involvement of all concerned HQs. Some areas where coordination and integration can be enhanced are as given below.

Planning. Joint planning for all stages of operations is essential if we are to ensure victory or success in operations In a conventional sense in the limited time span that a nuclear window would permit with our close adversaries only joint planning and joint operations would provide the results. In any other future employment whether it be in disaster relief, support to friends in terms of military support or disaster assistance or even ensuring protection of our national interests in our far flung investments the forces would need to operate jointly. Hence setting up of a joint planning body is essential. This body should function under the COSC as a part of IDS. It should formulate joint doctrines for operations in all types of terrain, joint concepts of operations and evolve common national strategic options.

Enhancing Jointness. The CDS would be appointed by an act of parliament. The appointment would thus be a top down approach taken by the government. However knowing that a CDS has and would be appointed in some time frame the Armed Forces must commence preparing for the same in the form of enhancing jointness at all levels. Such actions would ease the transformation process and help create a conducive environment for the introduction of a long awaited and over due appointment. In case such action is not taken, the change would be hampered by immense resistance to change and take a prolonged transition period. The suggested methodology of implementing this bottom’s up approach would be by a Vice Chiefs Committee which would work out the
modalities for enhancing jointness at all levels. It should consider inter posting of officers at various levels of service HQs including Corps and Command HQs of the Army, joint courses, joint training and sharing of assets in stations where more than one service is located.

Sharing Financial Resources. The defence budget is limited, the demands mounting. Sharing the budget between maintaining the force in being and catering for the force of tomorrow is an issue, which needs to be resolved. This issue would need the coordinated approach of the Financial Planning Directorates of the three services. The aim would be to determine the share between revenue and capital as also the broad share between the services in a more realistic manner especially where capital expenditure is concerned. This would be linked with proposed capabilities to be developed by the services based on future threats.

Joint Capability Based Planning.The present system of individual service planning and only coordination being done by HQ IDS needs to go. The service HQs must look for developing joint capabilities and not service specific capabilities. This would be a very major step in integration as it would result in early integration rather than belated integration. For this to be implemented there needs to be a committee headed by DCIDS (PP and FD) and comprising the heads of respective PP Directorates of the services. This would jointly evaluate the future needs and capabilities of the Armed Forces as a whole and determine the time frame for developing these capabilities. The committee would have to resort to joint capability planning approach as a means for determining these capabilities. Scenario building would have to be the proposed methodology. Though time consuming initially, however if implemented in letter and spirit the benefits would be immense.

CommonLogisticscum Maintenance Support. Presently even for common service equipment each service has its own maintenance support. This implies considerable duplicity in effort and larger revenue expenditure. Ideally creation of a common logistics corps integrating the existing logistics elements of the three services and subsequently working out measures to reduce revenue costs by amalgamating common requirements is feasible. Field logistics specific to a service would initially need to be maintained as hither to fore. The logistic corps could be earmarked to function directly under the COSC.

Creating Climate for Change. Inculcating and enhancing jointness requires hanging mindsets at all levels of the Armed Forces. This requires creating a climate to accept changes. It is in this that the service HQs have a major role to play. They have to play a wider and more active role in this change process. Initially an enhanced quality and quantity of discussion on integration and jointness at all levels, emphasizing the role of other services in exercises and operational planning, increasing inter service discussions in all courses of instruction etc would create a climate which would result in better inter service interaction and understanding. Ideally instructors from other Services should be posted to service specific schools and colleges of instruction to project a better understanding of the culture, strengths and weaknesses of their services.Enhanced social interaction is equally important to bring in better understanding and cooperation. For this service HQs must project specific instructions and directions in this regard. Social interactions would play a major role in breaking down barriers in communication and understanding and assist in creating a better climate for change.

Participating and Managing Change. Service HQs have a major role in participating and managing change. Change if adopted by a top down approach emanating from the COSC and service HQs would go a long way down the line. This implies a larger level of participation between Service HQs and HQ IDS, better inter service cooperation and coordination at the Service HQs level and enhanced interaction at the COSC levels. Such action would slowly remove the fears within the services, break down barriers in inter service relations and manage change at all levels. Presently limited vacancies are available in service HQs for officers from other services. Enhancing the quantum of such vacancies would enable better integration and coordination. For such action there is a need to create a joint pool of officers available at all times.

Creating a Joint Cadre. There is a need to create a joint pool of officers who can be posted to other service HQs at various levels. Presently other than the DSSC, CDM, HC Courses and NDC no other options exist. Even within these institutions, joint subjects are given very limited emphasis and importance. There is therefore a need to commence joint service courses for the junior level. In institution such as the DSSC the emphasis should be more on joint aspects rather than service specific issues and topics. This would
enhance the pool of officers for a start. Subsequently as the pool enlarges, making it essential for officers to serve in a joint organization or another service HQ prior to
obtaining flag ranks can be implemented.

Common Military Law. For implementing and enhancing jointness at all levels creating a common Armed Forces Law is essential. The present service specific laws need to be changed. The issue has been debated but no solution has been found.

Conclusion
Jointness is the way of the future. The changing security environment and nature
of threats would in the future have the Armed Forces operate jointly and in close coordination to achieve desired results. This would require the Armed Forces to change their organizations, doctrines, concepts and finally capabilities. This is only possible if all actions and planning is done now and that also in a joint environment. For the Armed Forces to be able to do so, the service HQs and HQ IDS have a major role to play. They have to create an environment which will accept change willingly and with minimum turmoil. Active participation and involvement by all would go a long way in bringing about this change. This would benefit the services immensely in the long run.

About The Author :-
Brig Harsha Kakar, an alumni of NDA was commissioned into the Regiment of Artillery in 1979. The officer is a graduate of LGSC, DSSC and LDMC. He has also attended the National Security Studies Course at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto. He has been the GSO 1 (Ops) of an Infantry Division, DAMS in MS Branch and a Directing Staff at the College of Defence Management. He is presently Commanding an Artillery Brigade.