JOINTMANSHIP AND INTEGRATION: A CONTEXUAL AND IMPERATIVE JOURNEY

Introduction

1. Concern for the security of a nation is as old as the birth of a nation- state itself. In a way, it can even be traced to the evolution of civil society when man transformed himself from the state of nature to a civil society, where he could seek collective security for himself and his fellow beings. However, academic interest in national security developed only in the interregnum of the two world wars. The aftermath of World War II lead to de-colonization and emergence of a host of new nations. This obviously brought with it an awareness of issues involved with independent existence and underlined the problems of a modern state. Territorial integrity thus became a concern. Growth of military hardware and military doctrines was therefore axiomatic. These were born out of the experience of long drawn campaigns, yet, they did not remain contextual. A more comprehensive view of National Security developed due to the Cold War era that simultaneously followed. At this stage the actual use of military power had got linked to the power of nuclear destruction and the futility of its actual usage became evident. Instead, National Security got linked to a more sophisticated usage of National Power as an element of a more comprehensive construct.

2. Current security concerns may continue to relate to self- preservation but the threats and means have undergone a major change. National Security is today related to ‘the capacity to retain and further, legitimate National interests, without feeling compelled to compromise on them to avoid war and the ability to go to war if these are challenged’. The concept of a Nation state itself is undergoing a change and is moving beyond a mere territorial bonding and is becoming associated with psychological integration. Terrorism and asymmetry that remain the challenges of the day, primarily target this linkage of the individual with the State. No wonder that the developing countries bear the brunt of this generation of warfare. Relationship of National Security with National Power got established due to the international order that developed post the World Wars but the reality of the day is, that it has become a survival issue for a nation state. Internal values have intrinsically got linked to external threat.

3. The recognition of this changing definition and paradigm in India got highlighted by the Kargill Review Committee (KRC), when even a minor incursion on our borders found glaring inadequacies in our National Security structures. The report drew attention to the fact that the original framework for management of the country’s security, formulated by Lord Ismay was not fully attuned with the complexities involved. Despite the sea change in the security scenario over six decades of our nationhood, the original structure has remained unchanged. The contextual connotation of security is more about ‘national wellbeing’ and includes issues that relate to economy, technology, food, energy and myriad of connected concerns. A host of structural changes were initiated as a result of the considerations by the Group of Ministers in 2001. Yet in terms of effectiveness nothing much seems to have changed. The reason seems to be simple – ‘while structures and decision platforms have emerged, mind sets and attitudes continue to remain oriented to legacy’. Practical yet effective methods have to be found for India, to realize its potential and bring in an element of evident assurance of its National Power. National Security is an integral and symbiotic part of this manifestation. This cannot come about without an enabling research and debate.

Aim

4. The aim of this paper is to highlight the factors that impede synergistic development of essentials of National Security and thus deny requisite levels of assurance for growth of National Power. In so doing, contour the immediate areas of work for the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies.

Specific Areas of Focus
Defence

5. Spectrum of Conflict. India faces daunting security challenges which are spread along the entire spectrum of conflict. On one end of the spectrum lies the sub-conventional warfare, while the other end is occupied by the threat from WMDs. Asymmetric, Conventional and Fourth Generation warfare lie at the centre of this spectrum. These challenges are interrelated and they span politics, economic, military and technological dimensions; as such the responses to these also have to be all inclusive, with military being a subset of these responses. The Spectrum of conflict is diagrammatically explained at Appx "A" att
6. Internal Security Challenges of India cannot be insulated from the responsibilities related to the defense of India. With asymmetry as a leverage and Terrorism as a mode, the goalposts of Security have shifted and become non definitive in their insularities. The initial manifestation will usually remain as a part a socio- politico- economic turmoil, expected in any society that is in Transition. Anger and Dissent are expected accompaniment of a process wherein layers upon layers of hitherto marginalized segments, gain empowerment. Empowered by leverages of technology and shrinking identities, this sentiment can be tutored to gather momentum as motivated interests and spoilers gain control. These would develop as terrorist acts, ideology and identity conflicts, illegal migration, communalism, narcotics trade and perceived alienation and finally lead to insurgency and secessionist movements. The covert text of the internal challenge lies in the escalatory dynamics of the dissention wherein the external factors lend support and influence its growth. This makes it a military challenge beyond a law and order situation. It can be planned and played as a doctrinal percept of an adversary. He would exploit these conditions as asymmetrical levers of fourth generation warfare. We need to calibrate and integrate our responses to these challenges which primarily remain with state/central forces until they transit from law and order situation to a national security challenge. Yet unless these are tackled at the incipient level they will develop as festering wounds that can prove fatal to the Nation’s growth.

7. Unfortunately the military domain is not linked with other structures of security through the Ministry of Defense or otherwise. There is lack of inclusiveness between defense planning and its military instrument. The result is that fresh concepts that are specific to challenges faced by India have not developed and we do not even have a joint military strategy. India has peculiarities of her own and no ‘single size fits all’, solutions can work. Quite sinful for a country of our size and potential. The comfort zone of status quo needs to be reduced through structural and institutional changes that tackle attitudes and not merely platforms. This can come about only with clarity of National thought on the subject. Sharing this in the public domain will not only usher in transparency (so important to democratic functioning) but also bring pressure to improve and be accountable to the validated strategy and concepts. India needs to accept that economic and social progress cannot take place in an environment that is not secure. A fortunate and yet coincidental combination of factors ( Economic, Demographic , Geopolitical) have created a ‘critical mass’ and placed India on a trajectory of growth albeit with concomitant security compulsions. Therefore no matter how pacifist our past or our natural inclination may have been, we need to align ourselves to contextual realities instead of sitting on debate and a wait for consensus.

Military Synergy

8. The luxury of learning while fighting is not available to the present generation. Today's world cannot afford long drawn wars due to limitations imposed by economy, scale of destruction and coercive pressures of the international environment. Nations therefore seek to achieve strategic goals in tactical time frames and compressed operations. In such a case, political and executive involvement in the conduct of military warfare has become a reality and cannot be wished away. Compartmentalizing of domains of influence in our structure has therefore become impractical, if not hazardous. Jointness has moved beyond mere coordination and cooperation. Integration in thought, word and deed, built on a common plan and under a unified authority is the essentiality of the day.

9. Our historical experience has much to do with the great resistance to change. Almost all conflicts have essentially been land wars with Army as a predominant player. Even today, the Army continues to be engaged in sub conventional warfare while the other two Services were involved with limited duration of wars with protracted periods of peace. The Army is therefore conceived as the predominant force in the Indian mindset. Its size adds to this feeling of imposition on the other two Services. A defensive and self preserving response from the other two services, has to be expected as a natural and expected reaction. Similarly, the IAF's experience has been of exclusivity and that of a supporting role due to Indian limitations of technology and affordability. It is now ready for an independent stature. It apparently wishes to assert this change in perception. Its position as the chief opponent to the universal reality of jointness needs to be seen in this light. The solution lies in the three Services recognizing the changed nature of the present battlefield. The Indian Air force also needs to reassure itself of the dominant role that air power will need play in any military environment of the present and the future. It is not a human failing that prevents accepting the undeniable reality of jointness and integration as a guiding theme; it is in fact an institutional flaw. The country has not developed the mechanism for a transparent articulation and debate about National interests and the plan to build on these. The subsets and core competencies therefore evolved on their own, without the unifying guidance. Advice at National level is thus either tentative or not thought through. A single point Security/military advice is no different and has become a phenomenon of avoidance through delay or specious arguments. As opposed to our situation, Pakistan has a synergized long term strategy against India. The whole paradigm works in tandem(incl Army-ISI-Executive - Foreign Affairs) along with clever diplomatic posturing. It is therefore not surprising that our response to asymmetric warfare does not lead to a requisite impact. While the National Power paradigm demands integration, there are warfare related aspects as well that demand integration on their own merit. These too need a separate mention.

10. Trends. Arguments about methodologies and operational parameters may come in way of defining specific conflict scenarios in the Indian context. Therefore trends in warfare may be a more comprehensive consideration for testing the inevitability of Jointness between the three Services. These get defined by the following:-

(a) Capacities to destroy are increasing in their precision and lethality, while the dimensions of time and space are shrinking. This transition is powered by a fluid technological horizon and if properly harnessed will provide a force multiplier effect. All this has to be managed by the skills and competencies of human genius.

(b) The potential of the nuclear bomb and its capacity to damage will need to be factored into our doctrines and techniques.

(c) Use of force will focus on all the State’s components of war beyond the military theatres and therefore space will change its present meaning.

(d) Battlefield systems will impact on the OODA loop with audio, visual, communication and on line guidance facilities. “Cyber Warfare” will become a tangible dimension.

(e) War is moving beyond the frontiers of land, sea and air and includes outer space and the electronic spectrum.

(f) National power will imply the capability and capacity to manage all instruments of war and secure National Interests. An environment, which includes threats other than military. In today’s world, encouragement of militancy and internal turmoil on adversarial side of the border makes more sense than actual conflict. The spinning of this form of warfare to a conventional stage however cannot be denied.

11. Nature of Conflict. Protracted total war between nations can no longer be taken to their logical conclusions of total victories. Conflict will be limited to objectives and objects of achieving and creating politically favorable situations. Economy, risk of heavy casualties, international pressure, increasing cost of weapon systems, problems of re-supply and the nuclear factor contribute to lend credibility to this postulation. All these issues are intimately and intricately inter-related and it is therefore difficult to surgically separate them in neat compartments.

12. Types of Conflict. The range will include the following:-Operations for Countering of Proxy War.

(a) Limited War to include Pro-active or Reactive dimensions.

(b) All out Conventional War.

(c) Counter Insurgency Operations including the North East.

(d) Border Skirmishes in our North or East.

(e) Collusive sp by neighbors between each other for conventional ops or in ignition of dormant sentiments and discords.

13. Dimensions of Conflict. Future Wars and Battle fields will be shaped and influenced by geo-strategic factors, operational environment, backdrop of Nuclear Deterrence, size and shape of economy and the state of the human resource as also managing and fusing the available technology. Though these factors are old, the emphasis has changed due to the phenomenal economic and human costs. Low Intensity Conflicts and levers of asymmetry will find preference. Methodology of War fighting will devolve around strategic dislocation by psychological paralysis of the adversary’s decision makers, both physically and logistically. The operational mix will include, Information Warfare, Isolation of high value objectives and threatening of alternative objectives, threatening severe loss of territory and destruction of forces including air power and force multipliers. The tempo of operations will be high and the notice will be short. The levels of strategy, operational and tactical will be imperceptibly merged and the battle space will be expanded to include the areas of interest and area of influence. The diffusion will result in non linear operations which are conducted simultaneously in the forward, intermediate as well as the depth areas.

14. Battle Space. The three spatial dimensions of length, breadth, height and one temporal dimension of time have traditionally defined battle space. The C4 I2 factors besides compressing the OODA loop can create a virtual asymmetry between forces which may otherwise be symmetrically balanced. These ingredients actually have the potential to change the basic relationship between offence and defense, between maneuver and fire, and between space and time.

15. Nuclear Threshold. While asymmetry will throw up a different challenge of assessing the nuclear threshold, their use is unlikely in a parity matrix and therefore field commanders could operate freely with this factor remaining a constituent in the overall war plans. This can only happen when knowledge is shared and allowed to grow.

16. Nuclear Potential. It is a part of National Power but mere possession does not make it so. The potential of it lies in its unstated but evident manifestation of possible usage , which includes: -

(a) Demonstrated possession of effective delivery means and evidence of strategic thought and political will to use the Nuclear Weapons.

(b) A National Comd & Cont structure for crisis management, int analysis, evaluation of war fighting options and procedures for release and launch of Nuclear Weapons.

(c) Linking of enabling intelligence with the management of Nuclear Resource.

(d) Demonstrated delivery capability and pursuance to include up gradation of advanced capabilities of missile and space.

17. Strategic Military Perspective. The questions which need to be answered in defining our perspective are:-

(a) Expanse of conflict – limited, full scale, single front or two fronts or a via media.

(b) Approach – Dissuasive or Deterrent or both.

(c) Pro-active or Reactive.

(d) Centre or Centres of Gravity and our approach to them-direct or indirect. Counter value or Counter force.

(e) Simultaneity of Engagement in terms of fronts, adversaries and expanse.

(f) Reach incl numerous smaller, shallower and swifter lines vis a vis potentially visible objective in depth.

(g) Balanced or heavy in the front of decision.

(h) Synergy in all components of war waging or war prevention, Linear and time separated or synergistic and synchronous.

18. Force Structure. The force structure has to respond to the dynamics of protection of National Interests. A mathematical listing of divisions, squadrons frigates and nuclear arsenal will be of little use. The key challenges which the force structure should meet are the important determinants :-

(a) Battle space will integrate land, air, surface, sub surface, sea, outer space and the entire electromagnetic spectrum.

(b) Flatter organizations with decreasing levels of hierarchy will have to come about.

(c) Info Warfare needs to become an operational function instead of a staff function.

(d) Shrinkages of available time and a larger envelope of target engagement will need to be integrated with high technology platforms for faster and more accurate response.

(e) Intelligence and battle field transparency will need closer integration with the operational components.

(f) Simultaneity of contact in the spatial, horizontal and vertical axis will need to be catered for.

(g) Vulnerability of electromagnetic spectrum and systemic platforms and their locations will need attention.

(h) Human Resource has to be organized to move from more ‘in the cockpit’ to more '‘in the loop’. Management of enhanced ‘informatics’ has to be built into the structure to respond to a fluid battlefield.

(i) Logistics, in terms of sustenance and vulnerabilities in an environment of transparency and simultaneity of contact will be a big challenge.

Technology and Warfare Linkage

19. Science has always remained closely linked with Warfare and as each grows better, it encourages the other. Evolving technology has influenced warfare for as long as it has existed. History has shown that victory has manifested itself far more easily and at much lesser cost with the side that has invested in the partnership with technology. Fields of electronics, miniaturization, composite materials and computing have impacted immensely in the fields of automation, precision and knowledge sharing which in turn enables decision taking. Cost effectiveness can come about only if such developing pursuits are supported and exploited by every stakeholder simultaneously. Exclusivity or proprietorship will only lead to unaffordability.
20. The need and the effectiveness of such leading edge technologies requires to be carefully examined and at times it may better to merely fine tune existing platforms and wait for the coming generation so that a quantum edge is possible by enjoining the next loop. All this has to be managed in a system that incepts success and failures in various ventures and accommodates user product improvement. Economic support for the Research and Development effort can be generated within, by considering export of technologies and hardware, when up gradation and next generation technologies are validated for production and induction into the Indian armed forces. This force multiplication domain however needs to be tampered by two guiding principles viz the ability to interoperate with existing platforms and the dimension of integrating with other systems and possibility of utilizing the existing peripheral technologies to ensure economy.
21. Much has been done in improving our acquisition procedures that will ensure attending to the immediate needs of the services; yet, the long-term framework needs attention since the requisite perspective structure has not been incepted. There is also a disjoint between the services and the DRDO. Developing of indigenous technological solutions, which are contemporary, needs to remain an article of faith. This can be realized only through an integrated view. Converting the realm of imagination to distinct possibilities is a programme, which springs from a singular focus and partnership of effort. This partnership has to encompass every possible competency existing in the country. It would imply a structured partnership to include the academia – industry – DRDO- users and the huge talent and interest of the Indian youth in the cyber domain.

National Power Grid

22. A sense of National Power Grid will emerge only after the fundamentals of National Will and Power are outlined with clarity. While these are not absolute values and tend to redefine themselves based on the external and internal factors that impact on a Nation State, yet, the essentials remain constant.


National Will

23. ‘National Will ‘ can be roughly defined as the collective value which the citizens of a nation state accord to pursuing an objective or aspiration for themselves and for which, they are prepared to sacrifice other comforts, peripheral gains and even sacrifice lives.

Power and National Power

24. Power can be considered as a concept that establishes control over a domain as defined. The essentials that define this concept are constituted through the factors of force, influence and authority. National Power therefore has an external domain and an internal domain. Regardless of how one chooses to define National Power its implications are:-

(a) The capacity to influence.

(b) The ability to control the actions of others.

(c) The ability to shift the probability of outcomes in own favour.

(d) The capacity to extend the space between ‘influence’ and ‘force’.

(e) The ability to build pressure; visible or otherwise.

(f) The capacity to impose one’s will on others.

25. The constituents of power suggest interplay of varied arenas/ platforms and throw up partnership issues that seek attention. Each of these interactivities presents a diverse suite of challenges for India and requires a detailed study. Only then can the enabling synergy develop.

International Arena

26. A Nation State cannot exist in isolation and has to accommodate the realities of the geopolitical world. As economy and technology redefine globalization, international relationships are being shaped through realization of National Power. Geopolitics is a defining feature of this need. Therefore, ‘Power’ will remain not only a tool of analysis but also an instrument of policy guidance and pursuance. Instead of moral principles it is eventually power and expansion of influence that guides geopolitics. Without Power, autonomy of action may only remain an ambition for the developing world because it has to contend with the overbearing control that the developed world exercises on platforms of international order. The last decade has seen a change in the determinants of geopolitical stability and cataclysm of emerging issues. These include the results of technology on weapons and warfare, shift in power equation and strategic centres and symbiotic relationship between economy and technology. India cannot remain isolated from these. While National Values and National Philosophy can remain generally constant, National Vision and National Interests will have to realign themselves to the changed paradigm.

27. Our policy formulations have to accommodate the growth of our national power and may be seek a reorientation instead of minor correctives. Some of this already appears to be happening. We are unmistakably transiting from the mould of socialist economy to a modern and capitalist economy and therefore the foreign policy is accommodating the shift of emphasis from politics to economics. India also seems to be realizing that it has a potential to become a great world power instead of merely being a leader of the ‘Third World’. This obviously implies discarding the anti western political impulses and shifting from idealism to realism. These changes may not able to produce the desired results unless these are linked to manifestation of national power as composite instrument.

28. India needs to understand that stand alone security is expensive and in fact creates further insecurities. Friendship treaties cannot guarantee growth of influence or timely support during an actual challenge. Discontinuities that may be worth highlighting are, that, more countries are independent today than any time in the past and yet their freedom is increasingly under assault and while alliances are declining, a network of bilateral relationships is progressing. Strategic partnerships, move towards multi polarity and inter operability with friendly and like minded countries appears to be the way ahead for India. If the country is convinced that it has an important international role, then the regional context becomes an immediate concern. It cannot be postponed or tackled in a knee jerk spasmodic manner. Development of National Power has to accommodate this geographic linkage of the aspirations of our smaller neighbors.

National Arena

29. National Objectives and National Interests are intrinsically linked to the ‘National Will’. In democracies with representative forms of Governance, ‘National Will’ has traditionally been accepted to be represented through the ‘Political Will’. The index of this ‘will’ can be further related to the percentage of unanimity that the issue or a bill enjoys in the legislatures. This unfortunately is factor of general awareness and the interest on the subject. There is therefore likelihood of a mismatch between National priorities and Political priorities especially where aspects of long term strategisation are to be juxtaposed with short term expediency. Influence of demographic inadequacies, thus, dilutes the actual definition of the National Will. The concepts of National Power and National Security have a long term orientation and in fact demand short term costs and sacrifices to further long term interests and goals. Whether this can built into the reality that Indian Democracy is; remains a moot point. There are far too many compulsions of the short term, for democracy in India, to change its orientation unless systemic and structural imperatives are built into our practices. The maturity of the democratic system and awareness of National issues is vital, if National Power is in fact to be realized. This can come about only through serious and wide spread debate in media and platforms that allow the ‘Public Will’ to be formulated and articulated. In India, debate on issues relating to the concept of National Power has been lacking. This exclusivity has to demystify so that accountability is linked with authority and responsibility.

30. There is no dearth of decision platforms in India and therefore the argument that we lack the structures of the developed world does not pass the reality check. In fact if anything, a sense of redundancy has been purposely created about these constituents, to ensure that single point views prevail, without the benefit of research enabled alternatives. This suits everybody because the enablers have neither any commitment or accountability and the actual decision makers need not be encumbered with even legitimate dissent. Each issue, in reality, gets treated as a stand alone agenda; without synchrony with a long term perspective that is important at that level. The problem is further compounded due to a void with respect to an articulated National Security Strategy or a regular Strategic Review. These documents in the public domain would have linked "National Will" with a comprehensive enhancement of National Power through all instruments of State influence. Integrative functioning that is time synchronous can bring about the desired change. Only then can we remain in step with contextual challenges that include fourth generation warfare, as also incept non military challenges of food and water security, energy, space, economy and cerebral capacities of knowledge and technology.

Intra - Government

31. The executive function of the elected Govt operates within and outside the legislature. Outside the legislature the decision taking can be broadly seen at two levels - Ministerial and Bureaucratic. If the political leaders have emerged post establishing the "National Will" on substantive agenda, the two levels can be seen as operating in synchrony. If, in a representative democracy the confidence is reposed on individuals/leaders based on local aspirations and personal preferences, the decisions on National issues may get swayed by political expediency or uninformed bureaucratic advice. Without an articulated position in the public domain through a regularly updated National document, the strengthening of National power can neither be monitored nor quantified against stated milestones. Transparency in an established and structured manner, can institute accountability.

32. Decisions based on committees at political or bureaucratic levels are an expedient and acceptable form. Unfortunately, in India, these are not structurally integrated in a seamless manner. The net result is that while core competencies get factored, the cumulative and synergized positive impact of these decisions, (on build up of national power in keeping with the National Will), is at best questionable.


Ministry of Defence

33. The strategic vision of a nation is rooted in its civilization ethos. Dr S Radhakrishnan, our philosopher president had said that through centuries Indian society has always venerated the sage in preference to the statesman and a learned man instead of a warrior. The importance of wealth and power, though theoretically recognized, was not practically realised. The concept of universal peace is perhaps the single most significant cause of the prevalent attitude. The problem is not that Security and Defence have been kept out of the National Perspective Matrix, the gravity lies in the fact that a disconnect between National Power and Military Power has come about in our "thought". Strategy has become the responsibility of separate and transient holders of offices in different disciplines of politics, administration, diplomacy, military, intelligence, sciences and economics. They have expertise in their own fields but the understanding of national power and security as one complete entity is a suspect. The compulsion is for this expertise to coalesce at a single point of influence to form a critical mass, for the evolution of thoughtful policies.

34. Contextually, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as well as components of Fourth Generation Warfare demand an integrated and synergistic response. The 'Group of Ministers Report' has brought about structures that are expected to deliver this synergy, yet the enabling attitude and approach is missing. Without the primate mover of commitment, the train of measures, albeit substantive, cannot acquire the momentum of evolutionary growth expected from them. Emerging challenges are therefore likely to find us as unprepared as hitherto fore.
Tri- Services Integration.

35. The three military services are the lowest rung of the National security construct and yet they are the most difficult to de-conflict and finally integrate despite the professional imperatives to conjoin. Integration or Joint- ness touches aspects of individual identity and the services draw the critical bonding from this very emotion for their cohesion and performance. Pyramidical structures are resistant to internal linkages as a design parameter and this creates greater emotive issues. Areas of partnership get viewed through partisan positions of 'them and us'. Correctives therefore have to be forced into the system and cannot be expected to emerge despite the professional imperatives. Expecting changes to flow from the operational level upwards is flawed due to the core and ingrained mindsets based on fraternity considerations.

36. Each of the three services is oriented to individual decision taking and is tailor-made accordingly. This compartmentalized system was challenged even in the Second World War when all arms concept/task force orientation saw phenomenal success in battle, as opposed to each combat force delivering its potential, sequentially. The Naval warfare scene has been continuously pitched on a combined concept albeit with ingestion of all components within the same uniform. The air forces have had a specialty orientation with costs and technology demanding a centralized control. Yet multi role and multi tasking is a reality of the day. All this is still related to a fixation to the historical past. Therefore while each service debates on the changing battlefield and modernization within itself, there is a great reluctance towards complimentarity and maximizing on combined strengths in the immediate areas of logistics, intelligence, training, cyber and operational domain so that the OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act cycle) gets reduced in our case and is interfered with in the case of the adversary. RMA connotations impel that this aspect be considered an essentiality and be ingested at every level. Without this, there will neither be synergy nor holistic resolution. Combining elements of two or more services is phenomenally more effective than simply tallying numbers. Integration does not imply monism and on the contrary the philosophy builds on diversity and draws strength from competing ideas. Concepts that emerge need to be pluralistic and based on discussed and experimented alternatives so that interests of each stake holder are incorporated.

Conclusion

37. Historical fixations and inertia of the status quo, can delay the integration of all elements of National Power. This trajectory can continue its unimpeded growth only if Security assurances are intrinsically factored into it. The defining contours of this inevitability are:-

(a) Non impeded economic growth demands assurance of security. Security self sufficiency on the other hand can come about only if the economic engine is allowed to lead it. A symbiotic relationship therefore exists between the two. This sentiment of partnership based on mutual trust holds validity not only within the country but also stands proven in the regional and international frame.

(b) Challenges of the contest of the future relate to low probability but high intensity. The requirement therefore is to concentrate on networking of systems instead of quantities.

(c) Security is moving from industrialization to informalisation.

(d) Unit cost of capability, forces countries to consider joint development of systems. Modern militaries today need to be supported not only by the State capacities but by modern corporate regimes as well.

(e) Threat to dilution of fraternity bonding and Espirit de Corps, are major hurdles in move towards integration. Status quo inertia needs to be circumvented by a Top Down Approach. The 66 other countries that have adopted this composite approach have contented with the same reluctance but still went ahead due to the utter imperativeness and urgency of aligning National Power with all its constituents.

(f) Even in India the need for Jointmanship and the value of integration has been articulated at all levels inkling that by the Prime Minister. Yet crucial implementation measures are yet to be initiated because of our penchant for accommodation and consensus. Unfortunately we cannot afford this luxury of delay any longer, if this window of economic possibilities has to be exploited for the good of the Indian people.

(g) All elements of national power and decision matrix exist in India. There is only a need to reassess the process of connecting the dots to create a synergistic whole.

(h) These platforms fall short of delivery due lack of enabling synergy. Synergy needs to be created by linking decision platforms at different levels through integrated underlying thought process.

(i) Partnership issues at various arenas and their impact on national power highlights the urgency and unavoidability of integration. Synergy is possible only through structurally integrated processes.

(j) There is need for transparent conversion of philosophies into concepts and these be translated into policies and worked through strategies and plans.

(k) The central thought should be all pervading and should flow in synchrony at all levels from National decision making to actual war fighting. It is only then that internal issues will give way to larger objectives.

(l) National interests and National objectives can get connected to actual delivery only through Jointness as an approach and as an attitudinal shift.

(m) RMA and Joint Warfare are a reality of the present and not about the future. Joint Warfare is not about war fighting alone but about war prevention and sophisticated use of the soft and subtle domain of national power application to further long term national interests without the need of visible action.

(n) Creation of permanent dependencies, joint training, multinational orientation and alignment towards chosen perspective are nuanced applications of the war prevention domain and integration of the military segment with National power.